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Review Article of 
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The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty 
Hart Publishing, 2010  
 
 
1. The Past and Future of EU Law: Premise and Methodology 
 
More than 50 years into the EU integration project, some of the systemic questions we cannot 
properly answer are improbably fundamental to the whole enterprise. This is certainly true if we 
probe its legal foundations. In The Past and Future of EU Law, Miguel Maduro and Loïc Azoulai 
bring together a remarkable range of contributors to do just that, selecting 12 clusters of ‘classic’ 
Court of Justice case law as reflective hooks.1  
 The objectives of the collection and the methodology applied are clearly explained in the 
editors’ Introduction, the key points of which can be highlighted briefly here. Looking across the 
judgments chosen, three overlapping categories of case law are identified (Introduction, xv-xvi): 
(1) cases that ‘establish and guarantee the authority of the Community legal order’; (2) those that 
‘legitimise the authority of the Community legal order’; and (3) cases ‘defining the borders of 
                                                          
∗ School of Law, University of Edinburgh. Thanks to Cormac Mac Amhlaigh for comments. Unless 
otherwise specified, all citations refer to essays in the volume under review. 
1 The cases are: (1) direct effect: Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] 
ECR 1; (2) primacy: Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585 and Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629; (3) protection of EU fundamental rights: Case 11/70 Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125 and Case 4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491; (4) protection of EU 
fundamental rights by Member States: Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v Dimotiki 
Etairia Pliroforissis [1991] ECR I-2925 and Case 5/88 Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft 
[1989] ECR 2609; (5) principles governing the preliminary reference procedure: Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and 
Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Minestero della Sanità [1982] ECR 3415 and Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollant 
Lübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199; (6) external relations: Case 22/70 Commission v Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, 
Case C-466/98 Commission v UK [2002] ECR I-9427, C-467/98 Commission v Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519 et al 
(Open Skies), and Opinion 2/94, [1996] ECR I-1759; (7) equal pay: Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA (Defrenne II) 
[1976] ECR 455; (8) constitutional discourse and judicial protection: Case 294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v 
European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339; (9) EU citizenship: Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] 
ECR I-2691 and Case C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091; 
(10) state liability: Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/10 Francovich and Bonifaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357; (11) free 
movement of goods: Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 and Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale 
AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649; and (12) EU sports law: Case 
C-415/93 Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921. 
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Community law’. In order to qualify as ‘classic’ case law, a judgment must not have been 
delivered too recently, to facilitate the application of critical distance; but it must also have 
‘survived the passing of time’ (Introduction, xiii). Its impact should still be felt as a legal precedent 
as the specific puzzle it addressed continues to evolve, but more broadly too, in three senses: first, 
its impact should also have rippled across other questions of EU law; second, it should contribute 
something to the constitutive fabric of the EU legal order, offering, in other words, a ‘broader 
normative lesson’ (Introduction, xiii); and third, there should be evidence of broader engagement 
with the judgment among the legal, academic and social communities within which the Court of 
Justice operates.  
There are four commentators on each case law cluster, drawn from four specific 
analytical communities: past or present members of the Court itself, established EU legal 
scholars; ‘new generation’ (Introduction, xiv) legal scholars; and ‘the view from outside’ 
(Introduction, xiv) i.e. scholars either from another legal or social discipline or from other legal 
orders. Each essay stands alone in the sense that contributors were invited to comment on each 
case/cluster in an open-ended way, with no specific division of tasks or prescriptions about 
focusing exclusively on particular aspects of the case(s), although the downside of this is perhaps 
the repeated rehearsals of facts and judgment summaries in almost all four essays on each case. 
Commentators were, however, invited to consider a series of common questions which are 
detailed throughout the Introduction. For example, they were asked to situate each judgment, and 
its application, in its particular economic, political and social context; and, as well as reflecting on 
the impact of judgments in the past, to think prospectively about lessons that can continue to be 
learned in order that the EU might better face the challenges of the future. Finally, the editors 
invite the readers themselves to become the ‘ideal interpreter’ of the ‘variety of viewpoints and 
different narratives on a set of cases that, in our view, embody the identity of the Community 
legal order and of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice’ (Introduction, xv). 
 This article engages directly with that interpretative invitation. As a preliminary point, I 
should set out my own methodological approach. Primarily, the article is reactive. It works with 
both the cases selected and the perspectives highlighted as its source material, and reacts to the 
essays contributed on that premise rather than taking issue with the collection’s parameters per 
se. In particular, the article does not, therefore, quibble with the inclusion of this or the exclusion 
of that case. It absorbs the criteria of selection and the criteria of evaluation designed by the 
editors. It takes a ‘reverse jigsaw’ approach, first breaking down the individual essays and 
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loosening the individual comments from the specific anchor of the case(s) on which they reflect, 
in order to draw out and then reconstruct the dominant themes and preoccupations that resonate 
across the volume. It tries to identify the questions consistently asked and to reflect on answers 
given – and not given. Above all, it asks whether there is collective, even if unintended, 
agreement on the contribution of case law to the evolution of EU law and on the contribution of 
EU law to the project of EU integration more generally. Re-reading classic case law is an 
interesting exercise. Most obviously, it reminds us what the judgments actually said. But it can 
also remind us that they do not always say what we think they said. We are all guilty of false or 
at least derived memory in this context, tending to read and rely on what other people say about 
the older judgments instead of repeatedly re-reading the judgments themselves. Especially in the 
essays contributed by past and present members of the Court, reading detailed reflections on the 
classics also reminds us of the very particular circumstances that were under consideration in 
each case, and we should remember this too when we attempt subsequently to decode and 
generalise case law messages. In the context of the volume itself, Nicolas Bernard rightly reminds 
us to be conscious of the limitations of explanatory narratives grounded in case law, since they 
may ‘invest judgments with a meaning and significance that they did not necessarily possess or 
were meant to possess, when they were first handed down’.2 So the irony of wrapping an 
additional and unifying interpretative layer here around a series of unconnected comments on the 
case law is noted. And it is also clear that the themes and preoccupations picked up on by this 
reader present just one of many potential stories suggested by the richness of the material under 
review. 
With this proviso in mind, it is presented here that the theme resonating most strongly 
both within and across the essays in this collection, intentionally or otherwise, is that of 
constitutional uncertainty. It will be shown that fundamental normative questions about the 
constitutional character of EU law remain contested. Whether this constitutional uncertainty has 
meaningful systemic impact in practice will be explored. Following a track of inquiry suggested 
by the essays themselves, the article then asks why the Court of Justice might have chosen to 
animate EU law in the way that it did (if we can ever know the answer to that question anyway). 
Finally, it concludes by reflecting on whether the constitutional course laid down by the Court is 
being continued, or needs to be corrected.    
                                                          
2 N Bernard, ‘On the art of not mixing one’s drinks: Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon revisited’, 456 at 457.  
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2. EU Law and Constitutional Uncertainty 
 
All law is in part a fiction…but Union law may be even more of a fiction, more of an illusion, than other 
systems of law.3 
 
Few of the 48 contributors to The Past and Future of EU Law reflect on the nature of the EU as a 
polity. This means that statements about what the EU actually ‘is’ are relatively rare.4 This is not 
especially surprising, or problematic, given that the contributors were asked to engage with a 
body of established jurisprudence and to contemplate its effects over the markers of time, impact, 
and so on. In prefacing his legal analysis of Francovich with some polity-related thoughts, 
however, Julio Baquero Cruz goes on to raise a remarkably rich seam of questions on the nature 
of EU law itself. For him, EU law is ‘imperfect’; it is ‘uncertain and ambivalent’: 
Torn between the domestic, the federal and the international, it seems to be much 
more effective than most international law and yet less effective than most 
domestic and federal law. Its nature and authority…can never be taken for granted 
… [T]he ‘existence’ of Union law depends on its constant acceptance by the legal 
systems of the Member States, the very ‘existence’ of which as closed and self-
contained systems is constantly put into question by Union law itself. This tension 
is characteristic of federal systems in their initial, critical or final phases. In the 
Union, however, that tension seems to be consubstantial to the general practice of 
the system, and no durable equilibrium may be available. From a legal and also 
from a political point of view, the European Union seems to be condemned to be a 
crisis system, never attaining a lasting balance.5 
 
So many conceptual leads emerge from this extract: the un-pin-down-able character of the EU 
and, thus, of EU law; the intrinsic connection between the EU and its Member States, and 
therefore also between their related legal orders; the contested and ephemeral qualities of EU 
legal authority; and the enduring elusiveness of resolution for the problem of systemic fragility 
that comes from this. The insightful portrait of EU law drawn by Baquero Cruz thus suggested 
above all, to me, the existence and persistence of constitutional uncertainty. While 
acknowledging the depth and nuance of possible meanings for the term, and the contested views 
                                                          
3 J Baquero Cruz, ‘Francovich and imperfect law’, 418 at 422. 
4 Some instances include Fennelly’s description of the EU as ‘an international federal polity’ (N Fennelly, 
‘The European Court of Justice and the doctrine of supremacy: Van Gend en Loos; Costa v ENEL; Simmenthal’, 
39 at 46) and Nicolaïdis’ explanation of the EU as a ‘demoi-cracy’ (K Nicolaïdis, ‘Kir forever? The journey of 
a political scientist in the landscape of mutual recognition’, 447 at 454). 
5 Baquero Cruz, n. 3 above, at 418-419. 
 5 
within the literature as to how or even whether it can apply within the EU legal order anyway, 
‘constitutional’ is understood here in an essentially functional sense as a framing or foundational 
structure; for present purposes more specifically, as the EU’s law-framing structure and, as such, 
as a relatively definitive and supposedly authoritative grounding for the impact and effect of 
substantive EU law. Yet one of the continuing paradoxes of EU law arises precisely from the 
deepness of its substance in contrast to the vulnerability of its roots. Another reason why a 
functional understanding of constitutionalism is also relevant here because, throughout the Past 
and Future of EU Law, there is much constitutional discussion but no real evidence of 
constitutional scepticism. If EU law is accepted as being grounded in a constitutional frame, then, 
ideally, that frame would be expected to provide the answers to questions about the 
authoritativeness of EU law and the durability of the EU legal order, generating in turn a 
stronger sense of systemic legal certainty than the concerns articulated by Baquero Cruz would 
suggest is in fact the case. Instead, the essays in Past and Future affirm the existence of the 
contradiction, in the sense that the substance of the law itself is recognised and engaged with as 
‘law’, and while the constitutionalisation of EU law is not definitively worked out, neither is it 
expressly challenged. But there are several allusions to the ways in which uncertainty permeates 
EU constitutionalism: it is not clear how or why, or by whose hand, EU law acquired its 
constitutional status; its constitutional content is not quite settled either (as will be seen below, 
developments such as EU fundamental rights protection and the polity’s grounding in the rule of 
law do flesh out constitutional content, but both past and future implications of that content are 
contested); and it is certainly not clear whether the EU legal order could be said to have a 
mutually accepted, definitive apex of constitutional authority. This sense of uncertainty is 
reflected most recently in the clumsy attempt made to salvage something from the express 
primacy clause included in the abandoned Constitutional Treaty.6 In its place, Declaration No 17 
attached to the Lisbon Treaty states that ‘[t]he Conference recalls that, in accordance with well 
settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted 
by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, under the 
conditions laid down by the said case law.’ The Declaration also incorporates a 2007 Opinion 
from the Council Legal Service: 
                                                          
6 The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2003 C169/1, provided in Article I-6 that ‘[t]he 
Constitution and law adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it 
shall have primacy over the law of the Member States.’ 
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It results from the case law of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a 
cornerstone principle of Community law. According to the Court, this principle is 
inherent to the specific nature of the European Community. At the time of the first 
judgment of this established case law [Costa] there was no mention of primacy in the 
treaty. It is still the case today. The fact that the principle of primacy will not be 
included in the future treaty shall not in any way change the existence of the 
principle and the existing case law of the Court of Justice. 
 
So, primacy as established by the Court exists, and we accept that, but we can’t really say so 
where it might count? 
The Past and Future of EU Law lends itself particularly well to inducing constitutional 
reflection given that the Court of Justice was the dominant actor in the attribution of 
constitutionalism to the EU legal order. The volume thus sets the decision in Van Gend en Loos as 
its own fundamental starting point. The real breakthrough in that decision was not, as Franz 
Mayer reminds us, the finding of direct effect for extra-national norms per se, but that this 
finding was made by the Court and not established through the – express – intention of the 
Member States themselves.7 Bruno de Witte emphasises the astonishing passivity with which the 
decision was then met by the Member States, ‘who [have] never tried collectively to overrule the 
Court’ (even though the governments that intervened in the proceedings were against the 
eventual decision), but more than this, by the national courts too, who simply ‘accepted that the 
ECJ could tell [them] which EC law norms had, or did not have, direct effect’.8 Daniel Halberstam 
reminds us of a fortuitous but potentially significant detail in this regard, that the preliminary 
reference came from a court in the Netherlands, ‘which had already adopted monism as the 
guiding principle of its own legal system’.9 
 What is additionally important about both Van Gend en Loos and Costa, however, was the 
Court’s appeal to ‘the register of legal constitutionalism’.10 Evoking a constitutionalism of 
uncertainly, Mayer tellingly captures, through the Court’s use of language in both cases, the 
‘peculiar twofold approach to European integration, where elements of public international law 
are still around while something distinct has already emerged’, something that ‘remains a 
                                                          
7 FC Mayer, ‘Van Gend en Loos: The foundation of a community of law’, 16 at 20; see similarly, B de Witte, 
‘The continuous significance of Van Gend en Loos’, 9 at 10. 
8 De Witte, ibid. at 13. 
9 D Halberstam, ‘Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend’, 26 at 30. 
10 N Walker, ‘Opening or closure? The constitutional intimations of the ECJ’, 333 at 340. 
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hallmark of European integration until today’.11 Why did the Court frame its reasoning in such 
loaded discourse? The key reason for doing so is not difficult to understand; using Neil Walker’s 
words, ‘in the complex, part-competitive and part-cooperative play of plural but interlocking 
orders, the invocation of the status-conferring, polity-implying language of constitutionalism can 
amplify and help bolster the claims to integrity and autonomy made on behalf of the EU legal 
order.’12 But where did this constitutional understanding of things come from? It is not clear at all 
from either Van Gend en Loos or Costa whether the Court spoke of sovereignty transfer because 
this is what the Member States did; or whether the Member States are considered to have done 
this because the Court decided to say so.13 Ingolf Pernice tackles precisely these questions, 
perhaps concluding the involvement and interaction of a bit of both; but suggesting also, having 
sketched the core functions of constitutions in general and finding representation of these in the 
Treaties, that ‘[c]onceptualising the European Treaties as “constitutional”, therefore, corresponds 
to their very nature and function’.14 In other words, does it matter so much ‘who’ called the 
Treaty ‘constitutional’ when its description as such bears up to objective scrutiny? 
And yet, that a doctrine so powerful, in light of the theoretical and empirical richness 
from which it draws, and so densely state-oriented can rest on so ambiguous a footing remains 
one of the greatest mysteries – or at least uncertainties – of European Union law. It is EU science’s 
own Big Bang moment: so much is now known, and accepted; yet what is not known or accepted, 
pertaining to the time and fact of the explosive moment itself, is fundamental to the truth of the 
whole hypothesis. It does seem a bit odd that so basic a gap can be identified yet proceeded from 
with a sigh or collective shrug, but it tends to be proceeded from nonetheless. 
 The exposition of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law marked a 
significant moment in the maturing of EU constitutionalism. We know that the motives here were 
inevitably mixed; the accepted narrative depicts the Court with one eye on tetchy national 
constitutional courts who had (valid) concerns about submitting national legal orders to the 
consequences of primacy in the absence of either direct recognition of national constitutional 
standards of rights protection or, as the Court eventually resolved it, an equivalent system of 
                                                          
11 Mayer, n. 7 above, at 20; he uses the example of the ‘Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe’ to 
demonstrate this. 
12 Walker, n. 10 above, at 338. 
13 See similarly, Ingolf Pernice, ‘Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of European law’, 47 at 52; he 
includes here the people of the Member States too, very much in keeping with the judgment in Van Gend en 
Loos. 
14 Pernice, n. 13 above, at 54. 
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supranational protection instead.15 The contemporary uncertainty about the scope of Member 
State obligations to comply with EU fundamental rights standards – does this apply only when 
Member States are implementing EU law in a positive sense (e.g. transposing a directive) or must 
Member State derogation and justification arguments also comply with shared conceptions of 
those standards? – is raised in a number of chapters, but with no clear agreement on what the 
answer is, or ought to be.16 In Les Verts, the Court’s proclamation (at para. 23 of the judgment) 
that the (then) Community was based on the rule of law further substantiated the constitutional 
foundations set down in Van Gend en Loos and Costa.17 Interestingly, authors considering EU 
external competences frame cases like ERTA in similarly constitutional terms, also noting the 
same concern with ensuring the uniformity and effectiveness of EU law in these judgments.18 
Questions – and problems – provoked by more deliberate constitutional efforts will be picked up 
again in section 4 below. 
A critical causal factor in the constitutional uncertainty of EU law is reflected by the 
particular emphasis on the role of national courts that emerges from almost all of the essays. 
These comments were especially resonant of another contested debate in contemporary EU 
scholarship, that on constitutional pluralism.19 In Past and Future, authors raise both the ideal and 
practice of constitutional pluralism in ways that suggest two sides of the same coin. On the one 
hand, several commentators emphasise, as outlined above, the instrumental way in which the 
Court of Justice engaged national courts in order to make real the idea of supranational 
constitutionalism. On the other side of the pluralism coin, however, we see the mixed response of 
the national courts themselves, biting the Court that fed them by assuming the obligations of 
                                                          
15 See e.g. M Kumm, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold and the new human rights paradigm’, 106 at 114. 
16 See e.g. FG Jacobs, ‘Wachauf and the protection of fundamental rights in EC law’, 133 at 137-138; P Cruz 
Villalón, ‘“All the guidance”: ERT and Wachauf’, 162 at 169. There is a persisting disconnect between the 
Lisbon Treaty text and the explanatory notes discussing that text on this point; see further, N Nic Shuibhne, 
‘Margins of appreciation: National values, fundamental rights and EC free movement law’, (2009) 34:2 
ELRev 230, at 241-243.  
17 Koen Lenaerts charts the complexity and evolution of the inter-linked ‘complete system of judicial 
protection’ in the EU also flagged in Les Verts (K Lenaerts, ‘The basic constitutional charter of a community 
based on the rule of law’, 295 at 303-4 especially). 
18 See e.g. P Eeckhout, ‘Bold constitutionalism and beyond’, 218, who traces the Court’s ‘strong 
constitutionalist approach’ (218) in his discussion of ERTA. More generally, Christophe Hillion argues that 
the decision in ERTA ‘catalyses the on-going emergence of the Community as law-making actor on the 
global stage’ (C Hillion, ‘ERTA, ECHR and Open Skies: Laying the grounds of the EU system of external 
relations’, 224 at 225).  
19 For detailed overview and discussion of contemporary scholarship on constitutional pluralism, see N 
Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’, in M Avbelj and J Komarek (eds.) 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, forthcoming, 2010). 
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their empowerment through the Simmenthal doctrine but drawing a line at the point of 
subjugation of their exclusive national constitutional mandate. Thinking about the instrumental 
aspect, and the contribution made by national courts as (willing?) agents of the Court of Justice, 
Donald Regan observes that ‘the contribution of European law is to identify cases in which the 
national courts must undertake serious review, whether or not they would do so under national law, 
and with the Community watching.’20 In this task, the instrumental engagement of national 
courts21 aligns historically with the typical descriptor of co-operation – a dynamic filled out by 
Alec Stone Sweet in speaking of ‘persuasion, mutual empowerment, and inter-court dialogue’.22 
Nial Fennelly acknowledges the unlikely success of this process of co-operative engagement, and 
the national courts’ own role in fulfilling it, by pointing out that the Treaty in fact ‘says nothing 
about the obligations of the courts of the Member States, whether or not they have referred 
questions to the Court of Justice’.23 Also engaging with mutually empowering expressions of co-
operation, Hofmann envisages the EU as a plural legal order in which ‘precedence is given to co-
operatively created law over unilateral acts of the Member States’.24 All of this comes close to 
perceiving constitutional pluralism within the frame of an ideal process of judicial engagement: a 
mutually respectful, consultative process where instrumental benefits cut both ways.  
But Alec Stone Sweet then goes further, introducing the intrinsic tension in all of this by 
portraying an essentially vertical relationship, given the Court of Justice’s leading role in at least 
articulating the conditions for mutual engagement, but pointing out, nonetheless, that this is ‘a 
governance situation in which the organ empowered to make (or give content to) the law has no 
direct, jurisdictional means of obtaining obedience from a second organ, whose exercise of 
authority is necessary to render the law made by the first organ effective.’25 Moreover, Mayer 
argues that the preliminary reference procedure ‘radically disaggregates the state’ since the 
national courts ‘owe the Community a duty of obedience that is not mediated by the national 
political branches, national laws, or even the national constitution’.26 These are precisely some of 
the points of constitutional uncertainty that could have been clarified through an express Treaty 
                                                          
20 DH Regan, ‘An outsider’s view of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon: On interpretation and policy’, 465 at 470 
(emphasis added). 
21 Discussed in these terms by A Biondi, ‘In praise of Francovich’, 413. 
22 A Stone Sweet, ‘The juridical Coup d’État and the problem of authority: CILFIT and Foto-Frost’, 201 at 201. 
23 Fennelly, n. 4 above, at 45 (emphasis added).  
24 HCH Hofmann, ‘Conflicts and integration: Revisiting Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal II’, 60 at 62. 
25 Stone Sweet, n. 22 above, at 203. 
26 Mayer, n. 7 above, at 29. 
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primacy clause: in substantive terms, by making a Treaty-anchored statement on primacy, and in 
representational terms, by its acceptance through national ratification processes. That may not be 
very sympathetic to the ideal of pluralism, but it does bring constitutional certainty. We also 
know, however, that it did not happen. Given the mixed understandings of pluralism in practice, 
then, can EU constitutionalism be made at least more certain? 
 Zdeněk Kühn highlights an additional complication when he notes that ‘[t]he logic of 
European integration empowered the national ordinary courts and disempowered national 
constitutional courts’.27 This insight has been a critical catalyst, fuelling the Court of 
Justice/national constitutional court push-pull tension. Tridimas suggests that the express 
reference to the constitutional traditions of the Member States as a formative source for EU 
fundamental rights standards in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft ‘reconciled the primacy of 
Community law with respect for national constitutional traditions’, which therefore provided 
‘ideological continuity’.28 But we saw lingering constitutional uncertainty in the ‘classic’ era of 
debate over the proper locus of fundamental rights protection, evident still in the unsettled 
question about the continued legitimacy of the decision in ERT. Brun-Otto Bride argues that we 
also see it more recently in General Court and Court of Justice case law on the freezing of assets. 
He maintains that the evolution of more considered judgments, from a fundamental rights 
perspective, in Luxembourg is a reaction to the ‘renewed concern of national constitutional 
courts’ expressed through judgments dealing with the validity of the European Arrest Warrant 
and the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty itself.29  
 These are just some examples of the practice if not the ideal of constitutional pluralism 
that are discussed in Past and Future. They emphasise especially that non-hierarchical 
constitutionalism has an inevitably fluid quality, which others would describe less positively as 
variable or unsettled. Halberstam depicts the ‘mutual accommodation of pluralism’ as a 
‘continuing process’, leading us away from the sense that we can, or should, find a final or 
absolute point of resolution.30 The practice of constitutional pluralism is, then, simply messy, but 
should be accepted as such. It is not characterised by mutual submission to a relatively fluid 
conception of legal hierarchy in constitutional matters, where the point of legal hierarchy may 
                                                          
27 Z Kühn, ‘Wachauf and ERT: On the road from the centralised to the decentralised system of judicial 
review’, 151 at 161 (emphasis added). 
28 T Tridimas, ‘Primacy, fundamental rights and the search for legitimacy’, 98 at 99 and 98. 
29 B-O Bride, ‘The ECJ’s fundamental rights jurisprudence: A milestone in transnational constitutionalism’, 
119 at 126. 
30 Halberstam, n. 9 above, at 31. 
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shift according to circumstances but on a mutually worked out and agreed premise. Rather, it is a 
plurality of concurrent, mutually exclusive claims to hierarchy. The Court of Justice establishes 
and defends the primacy of EU law as an integral consequence of the way in which the EU was 
created; yet, at the same time, national constitutional courts retain and defend the national-
constitutional and provisional features of primacy recognition. Tridimas catches this plainly, when 
he states simply that ‘[p]rimacy means different things to different courts’.31 Quite naturally in a 
contribution reviewing classic case law on EU protection of fundamental rights, since this 
represents an especially acute sphere of EU/Member State normative conflict, he goes on to show 
how and why the Court of Justice made its non-pluralist claim to constitutional authority: ‘By 
setting itself at the apex of the judicial pyramid, the ECJ hijacked the constitutional agenda and 
set in motion a dialogue with the national constitutional courts from a position of relative 
strength’.32 At least one clear, and accepted, expression of hierarchy stems from the decision in 
Foto-Frost, in which the ECJ claimed exclusive power to determine the validity of EU acts. 
Tridimas points equally to the same non-pluralist attitude within national constitutional courts, 
since ‘the overwhelming majority of them reserve to themselves residual jurisdiction to 
determine the outer limits of Community competence’.33 And on it goes. Perhaps all we can 
expect from the practice of constitutional pluralism, then, is a tacit agreement to give practical 
effect to EU law on the basis of parallel constitutional understandings, until or unless national 
constitutional courts decide otherwise for their own reasons, when legitimated by the various 
national constitutions that they serve. Chalmers locates some justification for this position, 
reminding us that ‘the central justification for their powers lies in their being prudent guardians 
of the ethical settlements underlying national political communities and national legal systems. A 
strong case has to be made why they should give up these duties of guardianship.’34 Halberstam 
traces EU constitutional pluralism right back to Van Gend en Loos; and before that, he finds similar 
echoes in Marbury v Madison, in that ‘[b]oth decisions make important claims for central 
authority. And yet, in so doing, each inaugurates a regime of mutual accommodation among the 
competing actors lasting to this very day.’35 This is, of course, something of a paradox and so it 
can only work in practice if genuine pluralism is actually working beneath the surface in contrast 
                                                          
31 Tridimas, n. 28 above, at 103. 
32 Ibid. at 100. 
33 Ibid. at 101. 
34 D Chalmers, ‘Looking back to ERT and its contribution to an EU fundamental rights agenda’, 140 at 144-
145. 
35 Halberstam, n. 9 above, at 36; Marbury v Madison, 5 US 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
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to the public impression of irreconcilable claims to fictionally preserved, hierarchical 
constitutional autonomy with which we are all familiar. But the in-built risk is, of course, that this 
will only work while it works. 
 To bring some certainty, several authors comment that, in reality, the potential for 
conflict is rarely borne out in practice. Sometimes the Court of Justice gives a little;36 and 
sometimes it really does not, yet even here, the absorption of the Court’s decisions 
notwithstanding political and/or public narratives of disquiet is potentially astonishing. On this 
point, Chalmers expresses concern about what he terms ‘widespread recalcitrance’ among several 
national constitutional courts in the context of applying Court of Justice determinations on 
fundamental rights.37 He sees this as evidence of ‘little possibility of a European constitutional 
dialogue between national constitutional courts and little evidence of their weaving its case law 
into their deliberations.’38 Interestingly, Craig cites a 2003 study demonstrating that when 
references are made, national courts display an extremely high (96.3%) compliance rate.39 It 
would seem essential, then, to secure the infusion and mainstreaming of EU law and of its full 
potential in legal education across the Member States. Evoking the significance of awareness and 
acceptance as much as blunt information, Baquero Cruz argues persuasively that this has not yet 
happened ‘due to the insufficient penetration of [EU] legal culture in the legal cultures of the 
Member States’.40 He diagnoses the problem that ‘[m]any national legal actors and scholars still 
see the law of the European Union as something essentially foreign that does not concern them, 
that is not theirs.’41 
 
 
                                                          
36 See e.g. Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609. 
37 Chalmers, n. 34 above, at 144. 
38 Ibid. See similarly, D Sarmiento, ‘CILFIT and Foto-Frost: constructing and deconstructing judicial authority 
in Europe’, 192 at 196. 
39 P Craig, ‘The classics of EU law revisited: CILFIT and Foto-Frost, 185 at 187. 
40 Baquero Cruz, n. 3 above, at 420. 
41 Ibid. 
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3. Why Did the Court Do What It Did? 
 
[T]he acquired knowledge seems so natural that one forgets the fights that gave birth to it.42 
 
Baquero Cruz suggests that ‘the narrative of [the] development [of EU law] has been one of its 
drift from international into constitutional law’.43 More typically, however, we tend to attribute a 
certain consciousness to the Court’s constitutional choices, whether we do this ourselves 
consciously or otherwise. For example, Walker characterises the Court’s crucial engagement with 
the language of the ‘new legal order’ in Van Gend en Loos  as its ‘self-anchoring of the basic legal 
frame’, remarking, moreover, that ‘to suggest that this is an entirely innocent usage is to ignore 
the power of a certain type of narrative in the European constitutional debate’.44 While Mayer, 
reflecting Bernard’s concern about the imposition of analytical narratives after the fact, contends 
that ‘the steps taken in Van Gend en Loos did not appear that dramatic to the judges in 1963’,45 
Morten Rasmussen makes the important point that the Court ‘tried to push the EC towards a 
federation…by the means of law’ in a truly unfavourable political climate, thinking of the 
historical shadow of the failed European Political Community and European Defence 
Community, and the ongoing strain caused by the Luxembourg Compromise.46 Others are 
equally direct about the charge of a vision-equipped Court when commenting on later cases. 
Denys Simon, for example, describes Defrenne as ‘a paradigmatic case of the judicial strategy 
adopted by the Court of Justice in its flamboyant period.’47 Robert Post intimates that, in ERTA, 
‘the ECJ was driven by the goal of perfecting the European polity by theorising the circumstances 
in which the unity of external politics was necessary in order to safeguard the conduct of internal 
politics’.48 Commenting on Les Verts, Jean-Paul Jacqué argues that ‘the pre-eminence of the rule of 
law thus empowers the Court to implicitly revise the Treaty so that the Court can play its full role.’49 
                                                          
42 J-P Jacqué, ‘Les Verts v European Parliament’, 316 at 323. 
43 Baquero Cruz, n. 3 above, at 421 (emphasis added). 
44 Walker, n. 10 above, at 337 and 340. 
45 Mayer, n. 7 above, at 21. 
46 M Rasmussen, ‘From Costa v ENEL to the Treaties of Rome: A brief history of a legal revolution’, 69 at 69. 
Here, as in so many instances given the historical ‘half’ of the volume’s objectives, the arguments remind us 
of JHH Weiler, ‘The transformation of Europe’, Yale Law Journal, 100, 2403-2483. 
47 D Simon, ‘SABENA is dead, Gabrielle Defrenne’s case is still alive: The old lady’s testament…’, 265 at 269. 
48 R Post, ‘Constructing the European polity: ERTA and the Open Skies judgments’, 234 at 241. He goes so far 
as to say that, in Open Skies, ‘the ECJ uses the cover of Community legislation to perfect the European polity’ 
(247).  
49 Jacqué, n. 42 above, at 318 (emphasis added). 
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Also strikingly, Koen Lenaerts recalls the timing of Les Verts, just after the signing of the Single 
European Act (in which standing before the Court was not assigned to the European Parliament), 
and so ‘it fell to the Court of Justice to uphold the observance of equal judicial protection in the 
Community legal order notwithstanding the Member States’ lack of consensus on the matter.’50  
 Surely those who might argue that the legal questions underpinning the importing of 
direct effect and primacy can be resolved on the more value- or motive-neutral premise of 
realising agreed contractual obligations must concede, then, that this language was not, in and of 
itself, a necessary feature of Van Gend en Loos or Costa. Pierre Pescatore confirms this instinct, with 
the bold statement that ‘the Court reacted…against the first manifestations of systemic 
opposition of the governments regarding the loyal execution of their obligations and against their 
ignorance of the judicial revolution brought about by the Community treaties in the banality of 
international law.’51 Walker goes so far as to argue that ‘for all its rhetorical charge, the 
constitutional symbolism has not made any apparent internal doctrinal different to the acquis’.52 
So even if we cannot know definitively know what the values or motivations of ‘the Court’ 
actually were, we can nonetheless assume that deliberate, value-driven choice were made. We 
should not lose sight, however, of the very real functional questions facing the Court in these 
classic references either;53 both ideology y and pragmatic interests seem, therefore, quite 
intertwined. 
 Maduro and Azoulai frame these questions by contending that, first, ‘the Court defined 
both the extent and the nature of the normative authority of the European Communities and, in 
doing so, became involved in the construction of a new political and legal community’ 
(Introduction, xvi) and, second, that, in fact, ‘[t]he Court’s greatest success may have been the role 
its jurisprudence played in the development of [the] legal epistemic and discursive community’ 
(Introduction, xvii, emphasis added). They also acknowledge both the positive (creation of a 
‘space for argumentation and debate’; providing guidance to national courts for future cases; and 
offering ‘a yardstick from which to assess the Court’s coherent development of the legal order’) 
                                                          
50 Lenaerts, n. 17 above, at 297. 
51 Pierre Pescatore, ‘Van Gend en Loos, 3 February 1963: A view from within’, 1 at 5. 
52 Walker, n. 10 above, at 340. Arguably, on one view, reliance on constitutional principles may, at least, have 
contributed something doctrinally in Les Verts itself (the case on which Walker comments) in order to ‘find’ 
standing for the European Parliament before the Court of Justice where none was (then) granted by the 
Treaty itself. But Jean-Paul Jacqué undercuts this, with his observation that the decision in Les Verts in fact 
inverts the idea of a Community based on the rule of law since the Court expressly ignored the limits on 
standing expressly codified in the Treaty (‘Jacqué, n. 42 above, at 318). 
53 See e.g. D Edward, ‘CILFIT and Foto-Frost in their historical and procedural context’, 173. 
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and negative (vulnerability to charges of judicial activism; self-exposition to contradictions and 
reversals through ‘not fully anticipating all legal problems’) elements of this mantle.  
 The involvement of multiple actors in the construction of EU constitutional law is an 
equally strong claim that resonates across several essays, however, – and, crucially, as a result, it 
is an argument that persists across time. Carlos Closa Montero is adamant that the idea of the 
Court acting ‘as a single unified actor pursuing an evolutional and teleological line of reasoning’ 
needs to be diluted precisely because of the ‘complex interaction between several actors’.54 
Moreover, Stephen Weatherill prompts the idea of active actor-participation, whether self-
interested or fortuitous, noting that ‘diverse public and private actors, at national, European and 
international level, seek to exploit EC law to achieve their objectives or to keep it at bay in order to 
protect their privileges.’55 This is a direct consequence of the dual impact of Van Gend en Loos, 
since the legal order enhancing application of direct effect also empowers institutions and 
individuals within that legal order, and this works in two ways. First, there is actor-participation 
in a formative sense. Commenting on Van Gend en Loos, for example, Franz Mayer states plainly 
that the Court followed arguments presented by the Commission legal service.56 Morten 
Rasmussen’s carefully researched historical analysis supports this claim.57 In this more formative 
role than the instrumental contribution already discussed in section 2 above, Christiaan 
Timmermans unpacks the essential role played by national courts in unleashing the considerable 
legal potential of the Treaty’s citizenship provisions.58 This is amplified in the contribution by 
Carlos Closa Montero, who also traces the critical role of national courts in highlighting questions 
of EU citizenship that needed, quite simply, to be answered.59 There is also, second, the 
importance of actor-participation in an implementation capacity. Maduro and Azoulai argue that 
‘[i]t is the internalisation of the legal solution embodied in a particular judicial decision in the 
institutional practices of the relevant actors that determines the real success of that legal solution’ 
(Introduction, xvii). We saw earlier that there are contrasting trends in this regard within 
contemporary EU legal practice (understood in its widest sense also to include courts as well as 
                                                          
54 C Closa Montero, Martínez Sala and Baumbast: An institutionalist analysis’, 394 at 394. 
55 S Weatherill, ‘Bosman changed everything: The rise of EC sports law’, 480 at 487 (emphasis added). 
56 Mayer, n. 7 above, at 18 and 20. Nicolaïdis makes a similar point in the context of Cassis: ‘as the story goes, 
the Commission fished around for a case of this sort and worked closely with the plaintiffs to bring it 
forward’ (n. 4 above, at 449).  
57Rasmussen, n. 46 above. 
58 C Timmermans, ‘Martínez Sala and Baumbast revisited’, 345 at 345; J Shaw, ‘A view of the citizenship 
classics: Martínez Sala and subsequent cases on citizenship of the Union’, 356 at 349. 
59 Closa Montero, n. 54 above, at 396-398. 
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lawyers). In the constitutionally formative phase at least, Rasmussen argues that an actively 
participating ‘transnational network of jurists’ sharing ‘a common federalist ideology’ played a 
valuable role alongside the Commission in this regard.60  
 Having rationalised the Court of Justice’s decision in Les Verts in the argument that 
strengthening judicial protection trumps political disagreement, Koen Lenaerts drew some 
comfort from the subsequent benediction of the Court’s choices through express Treaty 
recognition (in this matter, via the Maastricht Treaty).61 Is this enough? Is it the same as a 
judgment not being reversed? Fennelly notes that ‘[t]he Treaties did not provide for direct effect, 
still less for supremacy. They established the Court of Justice, which filled the gap’.62 Does the 
repeated practice of Treaty codification for judicially birthed principles provide the necessary 
degree of legitimacy for the frequently original character of the Court’s creativity? The express 
legal status granted to the Charter is another of several acknowledged examples of ‘express 
constitutionalisation’, if we apply, in the first instance, the modest definition of Treaty 
incorporation to that process. The enhanced rationalisation provided by the provisions on EU 
citizenship for certain developments in personal free movement law is another.63 The Treaty can 
be changed in the other direction too, however; for example, Damien Chalmers criticises the 
Lisbon Treaty amendment of Article 6(1) TEU, which wipes out the Amsterdam-inserted 
statement that the EU is ‘founded on’ respect for fundamental rights, as a ‘retrenchment’, 
suggesting that this signals that fundamental rights considerations are now to be ‘a second-order 
quality which conditions all the work of the European Union’ (although he also characterises this 
as ‘an acknowledgement of the cold reality’ and the manifestation of a ‘practical morality’.64 Takis 
Tridimas traces the (growing) references to the Charter in the case law of both the General Court 
and the Court of Justice, but he observes that, surprisingly, ‘in none of the cases has a reference to 
the Charter been material to the Court’s reasoning’.65 Supporting this thesis, it is somewhat 
curious to realise that the Court of Justice did not mention the Charter at all in Metock, for 
example, a decision that seems profoundly engaged with the realisation of fundamental rights 
                                                          
60 Rasmussen, n. 46 above, at 69. See similarly, De Witte, n. 8 above, at 9. But cf. Eleanor Sharpston’s 
discussion of the negative reactions that also greeted classic Court of Justice judgments (‘The shock troops 
arrive: Horizontal direct effect of a Treaty provision and temporal limitation of judgments join the armoury 
of EC law’, 251). 
61 Lenaerts, n. 17 above, at 297. 
62 Fennelly, n. 4 above, at 39. 
63 See e.g. Timmermans, n. 58 above, at 357. 
64 Chalmers, n. 34 above, at 149. 
65 Tridimas, n. 28 above, at 102. 
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(respect for family life in that case); and yet it draws expressly from the Charter in Laval, in which 
its understanding and application of the right to collective bargaining were sharply criticised.66 
Chalmers offers a persuasive critique that, incremental jurisprudence on fundamental rights 
aside, the EU operates under and within ‘the absence of a fundamental rights ethic’, a condition 
which is ‘particularly apparent when the Court of Justice is faced with ruling on sensitive matters 
that are strongly informed by powerful national or constitutional traditions’.67 It is difficult to 
dismiss the suspicion that the Court will carry on regardless, however; drawing expressly from 
Treaty and/or Charter provisions when these are helpful, but not being confined by Treaty 
parameters either. Treaty codification of Court practice might bring some comfort after the fact to 
public and political discourse, but it does not necessarily impact either way on the Court itself. 
 This leads us neatly to an even more difficult question: what if we pursue a more 
complex understanding of express constitutionalisation than post facto Treaty recognition? Can 
we still, under that lens, absorb and accept ‘the judicialisation of decision-making processes 
where representative institutions used to have the exclusive word’?68 Hofmann points, in the 
context of mutual recognition, to the even more acute impact of ‘horizontal integration’, in the 
sense that the judgment in Cassis de Dijon created a new dimension to Costa primacy through a 
‘trans-territorial effect of the law on one Member State in another Member State.’69 Nicolaïdis 
develops this idea, noting that ‘[u]nder mutual recognition, [citizens] must live with regulations 
adopted in other polities, in which they have no say. In democratic terms such horizontal transfer 
of sovereignty is a much more radical option than a vertical one.’70 Recalling the inherent 
tensions in the practice of constitutional pluralism, she adds that this horizontal process ‘is highly 
conflictual and will not happen without serious resistance’. In the specific context of 
proportionality review, for example, Mattias Kumm reminds us that the Court engages in 
systematic policy evaluations (and, through its usually directive judgments, policy making) 
through its application of the proportionality principle, about which ‘there is nothing specifically 
law-like’.71 He further asserts that ‘courts engaged in this type of rights reasoning are no longer 
                                                          
66 Case C-127/08 Metock and others v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] ECR I-6241; Case 
C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Eyggnadsarbetareförbundets avd. 1, 
Byggettan, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
67 Chalmers, n. 34 above, at 142. 
68 Shaw, n. 58 above, at 364.  
69 Hofmann, n. 24 above, at 66. 
70 Nicolaïdis, n. 4 above, at 450. 
71 Kumm, n. 15 above, at 110. 
 18 
enforcers of a political will that has previously created and defined a set of legal rights’. Even 
more cuttingly, he claims that ‘[s]uch a court has transformed itself into a veto-holding junior-
partner in the joint legal-political enterprise of developing and enforcing rational policies’. 
Arguably, this charge sticks even more powerfully to a court that behaves as such in the 
enterprise of constitution-building. These points will be picked up again in section 4 below. 
 As a final point, it is perhaps worth noting that whatever might be said about divining 
the motivations of the original Court of Justice, with just seven judges discussing every case, it is 
impossible to conceive of something that can still be described as ‘the Court’ with 27 judges 
working in variable chamber formations. Maduro and Azoulai themselves stress that we can ‘not 
ignore the impact this may have in the deliberative process of the Court’; moreover, ‘the relative 
weight of institutional memory decreases and collegiality tends also to be reduced … The Court 
will have to make an important effort to balance the quantity and quality of its judicial output’ 
(Introduction, xix). 
  
 
4. The Future of EU Law 
 
There is a notable theme of disappointed expectations in contributions (or sections within 
contributions) addressing the evolution of substantive policy areas through case law,72 
suggesting that there is still a lot of substantive legal work to do. The editors themselves predict 
growth in litigation grounded in, first, review against fundamental rights principles and, second, 
thinking of the explicit taxonomy of exclusive, shared and complementary competences 
delimited through the Lisbon Treaty, challenges oriented to controlling how and when the Union 
exercises its competences (Introduction, xix). Although Baquero Cruz drew an accurate picture of 
the EU legal system existing in an unhelpful mood of perpetual crisis, the day to day work of the 
EU and thus of the Court will nevertheless continue. 
                                                          
72 This is especially noticeable in the essays on Defrenne and the evolution of equality law in relative isolation 
from social policy (see especially, S O’Leary, ‘Defrenne II revisited’, 274, and H Muir Watt, ‘Gender equality 
and social policy after Defrenne’, 286); but see, conversely, the legitimacy concerns raised by Menéndez 
about the Court’s invasion of State-centred ‘distributive and solidaristic’ welfare regimes through the route 
of EU citizenship (AJ Menéndez, ‘European citizenship after Martínez Sala and Baumbast: Has European law 
become more human but less social?’, 363 at 390).  The ‘disappointed expectations’ feeling also emerges 
from the contributions by Bernard and Nicolaïdis on the free movement of goods, on the unfulfilled 
potential of mutual recognition; and, observing that the mechanism has never been incorporated into the 
Treaty framework, from the discussion of state liability by Baquero Cruz. 
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 But what is the fate of EU constitutional uncertainty? Relating his discussion to more 
detailed explanatory narratives of constitutionalism (that were admittedly glossed over here, in 
section 2 above), Walker locates the Court’s contribution to that discourse in the narrative of sui 
generic constitutionalism: ‘a narrative of constitutional self-understanding focused upon 
incrementalism and the patient building of the legal and institutional infrastructure of the polity, 
but with little reference to its authoritative and social registers’.73 Walker asserts that EU 
constitutionalism ‘was unlikely ever to succeed in these narrow terms’, and so, this is where the 
past and future of EU law must engage with the past and future of the EU more generally to meet 
the challenge of polity endurance. Linking the Court-centred constitutional project with the 
‘rituals of state constitutionalism’ through the overtly civic constitutional debate of the past 
decade that fed into the ultimately flawed constitutional settlement of the Lisbon Treaty, he 
describes how ‘the incremental constitutional story ran into other and, for some, more resonant 
constitutional stories based upon state-coded fears or hopes about European integration’.74 This 
suggests that there is a point at which, so far at least, the potential offered by sui generic 
constitutionalism simply runs out. Walker argues, first noting that, in the Lisbon Treaty, 
‘explicitly constitutional language is once again eschewed’, that: 
the constitutional future of the EU is not fated to be the modest affair intimated by 
the Court or indeed correspond to any predetermined template, but is an open 
question that can only be resolved, if at all, through the constitutional (or some 
functionally equivalent) process itself. The irony of the Court’s modest contribution 
to constitutional modesty, then, is acute. Without the incremental understanding of 
polity development to which it contributed, an explicit political discourse and 
process of constitutionalism may not have emerged at all. But that truncated polity 
vision, in tending to close itself off from the thicker and more politically contentious 
questions of Europe’s polity identity that a fully fledged constitutional debate 
inevitably raised, may also have contributed to the subsequent inability to find the 
minimal common terms which would allow such a debate to proceed in a fruitful 
manner.75 
  
Michael Dougan has captured this astutely elsewhere, with the charge that the Lisbon Treaty 
wins minds, not hearts.76 And that is not how we tend to appreciate the value of constitutions. 
 Thinking about the Lisbon Treaty a bit further, however, focusing on what it did do more 
than what it did not, shows also that the ‘Court’s modest contribution to constitutional modesty’ 
                                                          
73 Walker, n. 10 above, at 341. 
74 Ibid. at 341. 
75 Ibid. at 342. 
76 M. Dougan, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning minds, not hearts’, (2008) 45:3 CMLRev 609. 
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has left a powerful and indelible imprint. Explicit constitutional language is avoided, yes; yet the 
message is preserved in the knots-tying Declaration on primacy. Individual standing for judicial 
review actions before the Court of Justice, one of the longest standing thorns in the complete 
system of EU judicial protection, is quietly extended.77 Sensitive political decision-making within 
former Title IV EC will be opened up to the preliminary reference procedure. And the vast bulk 
of substantive Treaty provisions, where the Court has done the most damage/made the most 
progress, are almost untouched. The Lisbon Treaty is not just about the failure of a more 
sophisticated constitutional vision then, but about the clear entrenchment – through political and 
popular endorsement – of the Court’s thinner version. Since we are unlikely to see a fundamental 
Treaty revision debate for some time to come, this arguably signals that we have to recalibrate the 
idea of the constitutional uncertainty of EU law and accept instead, for some time yet, that 
constitutionally ‘less’ is nonetheless constitutionally enough. That that much is now certain. But it 
might not prove to be enough, because even the most densely constructed structure will fall 
down without proper foundations. Perhaps the message we can take forwards from The Past and 
Future of EU Law is that the classics of EU law have been comprehensively and thoroughly 
assessed, and it is the project’s emphasis on how we resolve (or learn to accept how we have 
resolved) many of the difficult questions that case law has raised that must engage us now. 
Because the future, constitutional and substantive, of EU law continues to unfold before us in real 
time. 
                                                          
77 See Article 263(4) TFEU. 
